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1.  Introduction1 
 
Foreign-owned firms in manufacturing have substantially higher labour productivity 
than domestically owned ones.  This basic feature of the UK economy has been 
known for some time (Davies and Lyons 1991).  The UK is not unique in this respect: 
the same is true of the US (Doms and Jensen 1998) and of Canada (Globerman et al. 
1994).  For the UK the productivity gap has been documented by Oulton (1998b); 
similar results have been reported by Griffith (1999a) and (1999b) and Wakelin et al. 
(1999).  
 
The first aim of this chapter is to analyse the extent to which labour productivity 
differences are correlated with differences in input intensities.  To what extent is the 
higher labour productivity in foreign-owned firms explained by the fact that they 
employ more physical or more human capital per unit of labour?   
 
Foreign ownership is not confined to manufacturing which is only around a fifth of 
GDP anyway.  So the second aim of this chapter is to see whether the foreign-
domestic productivity gap is as large in the non-manufacturing part of the economy.   
 
To anticipate the results, we find first that higher human and physical capital intensity 
can indeed account for most of the labour productivity gap in manufacturing.  Second, 
we find similar gaps in the larger, non-manufacturing sector. Third, in the non-
manufacturing sector too the productivity gap is largely explained by higher capital 
intensity.  These findings prompt the question: if foreign-owned companies, located in 
Britain and employing British workers, use high human and physical capital intensity 
to achieve high productivity, why don’t British-owned companies do the same?  
 
1  Fuller versions of the research reported in this chapter will be found in two discussion papers, 
Oulton (1998b) and (1998c).  A revised and expanded version of the second discussion paper is Oulton 
(2000).  The research presented in the first discussion paper was financed by the Department of Trade 
and Industry, that in the second by the Leverhulme Trust as part of a wider project entitled Job 
generation in the corporate sector [F/59/AD].  To both of these I owe thanks.  This chapter has 
benefited from helpful comments on earlier versions from Martin Baily, Peter Hart, Nicholas Owen, 
Nigel Pain, Martin Weale, and participants at the NIESR Conference on Foreign Investment in 
September 1999; I am grateful to all of these.  I would also like to thank the staff of the Office for 
National Statistics at Newport, in particular Wendy Fader, for assistance in using the ARD.  This 
research was carried out at the National Institute of Economic and Social Research prior to my taking 
up an appointment at the Bank of England.  The views expressed are my own and are not necessarily 
those of any of the above persons nor of the Bank of England.   
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Below we discuss two alternative, not mutually exclusive, hypotheses capable of 
explaining these findings: first, the cost of capital is lower for foreign-owned 
companies; and second, foreign-owned companies use superior technology.   
 
The two samples 
The present study will employ two samples, one confined to manufacturing and the 
other covering the whole economy.  Our first sample is of establishments (see below 
for the definition) in manufacturing and is drawn from the longitudinal database of the 
Annual Census of Production known as the ARD.  We are particularly interested in 
capital intensity but the ARD contains no estimates of the capital stock, only of 
investment.  So we use the investment series to construct our own estimates of the 
capital stock by a variant of the perpetual inventory method.  Because we need a long 
series of investment, our sample excludes establishments which are only temporarily 
present in the ARD, i.e. establishments which are “born” or which “die” during the 
analysis period 1973-93.  In fact our sample is of establishments continuously present 
in the ARD from 1973 to 1993 inclusive, which we call survivors.  There were 1,752 
such survivors of which 411 (24%) were foreign-owned in 1993.  These survivors 
employed 1.8 million people in 1973, 27% of all employment recorded in the ARD, 
and 1.0 million in 1993, or 34.5% of ARD employment.  The foreign-owned 
establishments employed 30.7% of the total in 1993.   
 
The country of ownership of each survivor is known for every year.  In practice, we 
use a threefold breakdown: US-owned, other foreign-owned, and UK-owned.   
 
The ARD records the number of white collar and of blue collar workers separately, as 
well as the average wage of each of these groups.  These measures are the basis for 
our estimates of human capital.   
 
The findings cited above on productivity gaps in manufacturing for the UK, the US 
and Canada have been derived from studying longitudinal databases of each country’s 
production census.  Outside of manufacturing, no such source exists.  Hence to study 
the non-manufacturing sector we utilise data drawn from company accounts.   
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Our second sample is of companies and is drawn from a large electronic database of 
company accounts, the OneSource database.  This database, which has been employed 
in earlier work on employment growth (Hart and Oulton (1996), and (1999)) and 
productivity (Oulton 1998a), is described more fully below (section 4).  In the version 
we use, the accounts relate to 1995. This second sample consists of some 32,000 
companies employing 8.6 million people; of these, some 22,000 companies 
employing 5.2 million people were in the non-manufacturing sector.  In this sample 
35.0% of total employment is in foreign-owned companies.   
 
In the companies sample we use the book value of fixed assets as our measure of 
physical capital.  Obviously it would be better to use the value of fixed assets at 
current replacement cost but such figures are not published in company accounts.  For 
labour input, the only measures available are the number of employees and the 
average wage.   
 
The OneSource database covers both independent companies and subsidiaries.  To 
avoid double-counting, e.g. including both the parent and the subsidiaries of which it 
is composed, we divide our companies into four groups: (1) subsidiaries owned by US 
companies; (2) subsidiaries owned by other foreign companies; (3) subsidiaries 
owned by UK companies; and (4) UK-registered independent companies which do not 
own any subsidiaries.  So our breakdown by ownership is more detailed than in the 
ARD sample.   
 
The two samples each have their own strengths and weaknesses.  The quality of the 
measures of human and physical capital is higher for the ARD.  On the other hand the 
ARD sample is confined to survivors in manufacturing only.  The companies sample 
covers the whole corporate sector and has better information on ownership.   
 
Outline of the chapter 
The structure of the chapter is as follows.  Section 2 describes our first data source, 
the ARD, and sets out how a sub-set of the ARD, consisting of those establishments 
which are continuously present from 1973 to 1993 inclusive, was constructed.  For 
this sub-set we are able to make estimates of the physical capital stock.  In section 3 
we analyse the determinants of differences in human and physical capital intensity 
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between establishments, in particular the role of foreign ownership.  We also quantify 
the relationship between labour productivity and the measurable inputs, human and 
physical capital.  Section 4 then introduces our second data source, the OneSource 
database of company accounts, and describes how the companies sample was derived.  
Section 5 repeats for this sample the analysis of section 3 on the determinants of 
human and physical capital intensity and the causes of productivity differences.  Then 
in section 6 we discuss two hypotheses which are capable of explaining the findings:  
Finally, section 7 summarises our conclusions.   
 
 
2.   The ARD 
The ARD, or ABI Respondents Database to give it its full name, is an electronic 
database of the Annual Business Inquiry (Production), formerly known as the Annual 
Census of Production (ACOP).  In principle, the ARD includes all the data collected 
under ACOP from 1970 to the present.  It covers the whole of the production sector, 
manufacturing plus mining and quarrying and, for recent years, construction: see 
Oulton (1997) for a full description.  The present chapter uses only the data for 
manufacturing.   
 
The most basic unit in the ARD is the “local unit”, defined as a plant or office at a 
single location.  Above that is the establishment, which is the reporting unit.  An 
establishment consists of at least one local unit (itself) and may consist of more.  In 
recent years a bit under half of employment in “selected” establishments2 has been in 
establishments consisting of just one local unit and nine tenths in establishments with 
no more than 10 local units. Most of the data in the ARD relate to the establishment as 
a whole.  The establishment may or not be a company in the legal sense.  In 1987, 
“company-based reporting” was introduced into the Census and the reporting units are 
now referred to as “businesses”.  But the larger companies continued to be split up 
into smaller units.3  
 
2  A “selected” establishment is one which is required by law to fill in a return.  Apart from being in 
scope to the inquiry, an establishment must be of a certain size, which normally means employing 20 or 
more people, to be selected.   
3  It is not clear without further research how much difference this change made.  For clarity, and 
because most of the data used here were collected before the change to company-based reporting, we 
continue to use the term “establishment”.  Note that in American usage an establishment is a plant and 
this should be borne in mind when comparing the present results with US ones.   
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Three measures of output are available from the ARD.  In descending order of size 
these are: gross output, net output and gross value added.  Gross output and gross 
value added (GVA) are used, the latter mainly because it is additive across 
establishments and industries.  Gross output and GVA which are reported in current 
prices were converted to 1990 prices using producer price indexes for each Class of 
the 1980 SIC (of which there are 22 within manufacturing: see Appendix A).4  For the 
period studied here, industry is recorded in the ARD under the 1980 SIC.   
 
Two measures of labour input are available from the ARD: the number of operatives 
and the number of administrative, technical and clerical employees (ATCs).5  No data 
on hours worked are available at the establishment level.  Apart from the split into 
operatives and ATCs, there are no data on skills.  However, average wages for each 
group are given and these may be used as proxies for relative skills or human capital 
at a point in time.    
 
Real intermediate input is also required for some of the comparisons but the ARD 
contains only nominal intermediate input.  We deflate the latter, defined as nominal 
gross output minus nominal GVA, by the Producer Price Index for materials and fuel 
for each SIC80 Class.   
 
Under the heading of investment, ACOP and the ARD distinguish four categories: (1) 
new building work; (2) land & existing buildings; (3) plant & machinery; and (4) 
vehicles.  Each category except the first is measured as acquisitions less disposals.  
This means that each category of investment except the first can be, and frequently is, 
negative for an individual establishment.  From 1992, the breakdown by type is no 
longer available at the establishment level.  A further difficulty is that prior to 1979 
the four categories are only recorded in the ARD for a minority of establishments; the 
reason for this is not clear.  The upshot is that a breakdown by category is only 
available for the period 1979-91 inclusive. Total investment, the sum over these four 
 
4  For Classes 21, 36 and 44 no PPI exists so the PPI for manufacturing as a whole was used.  These 
deflators were obtained from Datastream.  
5  In addition there is the small category of “working proprietors”.  Where available this has been 
amalgamated with ATCs.   
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categories, is therefore used as the investment measure.  Total investment can also be 
negative at the establishment level.   
 
Investment is recorded gross of depreciation.  From 1988, investment includes assets 
acquired under financial leasing.  Prior to 1988, financial leasing was omitted.  It is 
important to note that though asset disposals are given as well as acquisitions, “the 
figures for disposals exclude amounts written off for capital assets which are 
scrapped” (Introduction to the Summary Volume of the Census of Production, various 
issues).  In other words, scrapping is not recorded.   
 
Investment in the ARD is also in current prices.  It was deflated to 1990 prices by the 
implicit deflator for manufacturing investment (the latter obtained by dividing total 
manufacturing investment in current prices by investment in constant 1990 prices, 
both from the Blue Book via Datastream).   
 
For the analysis of productivity, we are usually more interested in the capital stock, 
rather than in investment.  Here we run up against a difficulty.  The ARD contains no 
data on capital stocks, not even book values.  So we must estimate stocks by 
cumulating investment flows.  To do so, we have to assume an initial, year zero, 
capital stock.  If the year zero is sufficiently far in the past, and the depreciation rate 
sufficiently high, the stock estimates for later years will not be too sensitive to the 
assumed initial stock.  But thousands of establishments are entering and leaving the 
ARD every year.  Capital stock estimates based on only a few years of cumulated 
investment will be too unreliable to use.   
 
Our strategy to deal with this problem is to create a dataset of survivors, in this case 
establishments who are continuously present in the ARD from 1973 to 1993.  We 
proceed as follows.  We start with a benchmark capital stock in 1973 for each 
establishment.  We then estimate the stock K in subsequent years by the standard 
perpetual inventory method:  
 
 K I Kt t t= + − −( )1 1δ  
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where I is real investment and δ is the depreciation rate.  Depreciation measures the 
decline in the stock due to physical wear and tear, gradual obsolescence, and 
scrapping or retirement.  U.S. research suggests that depreciation rates much higher 
than those assumed by the ONS for their “net stock” estimates are appropriate 
(Fraumeni 1997).  In line with these results, an annual rate of depreciation of 7.5% is 
assumed.  To get the initial capital stock for each establishment, we multiply each 
establishment’s 1973 employment level by the capital-labour ratio for the SIC80 Class 
to which the establishment belongs.6   
 
 
3.   The importance of being foreign-owned 
Characteristics of survivors 
There are 1,752 establishments which are present throughout the period 1973-93 (the 
latest available year when this research began7).  In 1973 employment in these 
survivors was nearly 1.8 million and constituted 29.6% of all employment recorded in 
the ARD.  In 1993, the corresponding figures were just over 1 million or 34.5% of 
total ARD employment (ARD employment is about 80% of total employment in 
manufacturing).  These survivors exhibited a wide range of size.  In 1973, the 28 
establishments with 7,500 or more employees accounted for 24.9% of employment in 
survivors; by 1993 there were only 8 such establishments and their employment share 
had halved to 12.8%.   
 
The rates of growth of capital (and other inputs) vary across establishments.  That 
these differences are cumulative and not just transitory can be seen from Table 1 
which shows the standard deviation of the log of the capital-labour ratio by SIC80 
Class in 1993.  Analysis of variance shows that most of the overall variation of this 
variable, 59%, is due to variation within Classes, not between them.  This is rather 
remarkable given that the capital estimates assume that in 1973 the capital-labour 
ratio was identical for every establishment in a given Class.8 The question then arises, 
 
6  I am grateful to my former colleague Mary O’Mahony for supplying me with these capital-labour 
ratios.  The initial capital stocks for each Class have been derived by the perpetual inventory method 
using similar but more detailed assumptions about depreciation rates to the one in the text.  
7  The earliest year in the ARD is 1970 but the data for the years 1970-72 were not in a form 
amenable to analysis when the research was carried out.   
8  If we disaggregate further, industrial structure will of course explain more of the variation.  The 
1,752 survivors fall into 198 4 digit Activity Headings.  Analysis of variance using Activity Headings 
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are there any systematic factors behind these differences in capital stock growth rates 
and the eventual differences in levels to which they give rise? In this section, we 
consider the possible role of foreign ownership.   
 
It has long been known from the published results of ACOP that foreign-owned firms 
tend to have higher labour productivity than domestically-owned ones.  Only a part of 
this disparity can be explained by a relative concentration of foreign-owned firms in 
high productivity sectors (Davies and Lyons 1991).  What has not been so clear is the 
source of the foreign-owned firms’ advantage.   
 
Of the 1,752 surviving establishments, 176 were US-owned and a further 235 were 
owned by non-US foreign interests in 1993 (the latest year available).9 The US-owned 
firms accounted for 16.6% of total employment and the foreign, non-US ones for 
14.1%.  Thus getting on for a third of employment amongst survivors was in foreign-
owned firms.  Table 2 first documents that the productivity gap between UK- and 
foreign-owned firms applies to survivors, as well as to manufacturing as a whole.  In 
1993, value added per employee was 55% higher in US-owned establishments and 
25% higher in non-US foreign-owned establishments than in UK-owned ones.  These 
huge gaps are similar in size to the cross-country gaps which are estimated to exist 
between UK labour productivity in aggregate manufacturing on the one hand and US, 
Japanese or European productivity on the other (O’Mahony 1999).   
 
We can also see from Table 2 that the average worker in a US-owned establishments 
had 54% more capital to work with, and the average worker in other foreign-owned 
establishments 47% more, than did their counterparts in UK-owned ones.  We can 
also note that the proportion of employment which is white collar (ATCs) is 7-10 
percentage points higher in foreign-owned establishments.  White collar workers on 
average earn more than blue collar ones and we can also see that within each category 
wages are higher in foreign-owned establishments.  For operatives, wages are 16-24% 
higher and for ATCs, 12-20% higher.  Since companies do not pay higher wages out 
 
instead of Classes shows that industrial structure can explain 58% of the variance of the log of capital 
intensity in 1993.  But the average number of establishments per Activity Heading is now less than 9 so 
the additional explanatory power is rather spurious.  If we could disaggregate still further, eventually 
everything could be explained by industrial structure.   
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of the goodness of their hearts, this suggests that workers in foreign-owned 
establishments are more skilled.  Thus it appears to be the case that foreign-owned 
establishments, particularly US ones, employ substantially higher physical and human 
capital per worker.   
 
Because the ARD allows us to look at the history of individual establishments, we can 
also compare growth rates by type of ownership (Table 3).  Again the performance of 
foreign-owned establishments stands out.  Value added per employee and capital per 
employee have both been rising much more rapidly in foreign-owned establishments.  
The capital stock of UK-owned establishments grew on average at only 1.04% p.a. 
over 1973-93, while that of US-owned ones grew at 2.86% p.a. and that of other 
foreign owned ones at 2.23%.  However, there is an important contrast between US 
and other foreign establishments.  In US-owned establishments, value added has been 
rising while in other foreign owned ones it has been falling, as it has too in UK-owned 
establishments.  Furthermore, while employment has been falling in all types of 
establishment, it has done so most in other foreign-owned plants and least in US-
owned ones.   
 
These differences cannot be dismissed as due solely to differences in industrial 
structure as between foreign and domestic establishments.  In 13 out of 17 Classes 
foreign-owned establishments have substantially higher capital per employee and in 
12 out of 17 they have substantially higher value added per employee.  UK-owned 
establishments have substantially higher value added per employee in only one Class 
(35): see Oulton (1998b), Table 10.   
 
Analysing the foreign advantage 
We now take a more formal approach and test whether, after controlling for industrial 
structure, ownership is a significant determinant of input intensities.  To test our 




9  Foreign-owned establishments include those deemed to be controlled by enterprises incorporated 














= + + + +         (1) 
 
where Z is alternately capital per employee (K/L), the operative wage (wOP), the ATC 
wage (wATC), the ATC proportion (ATC/L), intermediate input per employee (M/L), 
and value added per employee (V/L); all these variables are in logs.  US is a dummy 
variable taking the value 1 if the establishment is US-owned.  NON-US is a similar 
dummy variable taking the value 1 if the establishment is foreign-owned but not US-
owned.  The Class variables are dummies for membership in each of the S classes 
within SIC80 manufacturing.  In practice S=21 since there are no observations in 
Class 21; see Appendix A for the names of the Classes.   
 
Table 4 shows the results.  All the major differences noted above between foreign and 
UK-owned establishments turn out to be statistically highly significant, even when we 
correct for industrial structure.  Both US and non-US owned foreign establishments 
have higher productivity, a higher ATC proportion, higher wages, and higher capital 
per worker than their domestic counterparts. By comparing the coefficients on the 
ownership dummies with the crude, percentage gaps in Table 2, we see that industrial 
structure does matter.  But after adjustment, we still find large differences between 
foreign and UK-owned establishments.  The largest adjusted difference is in 
intermediate input per employee: 55% for US-owned and 54% for other foreign 
owned establishments.10   
 
However, we should also note from Table 2 that foreign establishments, particularly 
US ones, tend to be larger than domestic ones.  It is generally believed that larger 
establishments pay higher wages than smaller ones and have higher labour 
productivity; this is true with our data too.  So the foreign advantage might be an 
artefact.  If size measured by employment is included, it is significant in the equations 
for wages, the ATC proportion and intermediate input but has little effect on the 
 
10  Doms and Jensen (1998) and Globerman et al. (1994) report similar findings for the US and 
Canada respectively, namely that foreign-owned firms have higher labour productivity, higher capital 
intensity and use more skilled labour and that these differences remain after controlling for industrial 
composition and size. As regards the role of capital intensity, note that these authors are forced to use 
proxies: book value in the case of Doms and Jensen and energy input in the case of Globerman et al. In 
this respect, the results in the present chapter may be regarded as stronger, at least for manufacturing.  
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coefficients on the ownership dummies.  In any case, one might argue that size should 
be excluded since it is under the control of management.11   
 
Turning to productivity, our hypothesis is that it may differ between establishments 
because (a) some establishments use more inputs per worker and (b) some 
establishments may have access to superior technology or superior business systems 
or may have superior products, i.e. products which can be sold at a higher price.  Input 
intensity is measured by physical capital per worker and human capital per worker.  
We have no measures of superior technology or products but we can check whether, 
after controlling for input intensity, higher productivity is associated with ownership.  
Note that different types of ownership may be associated with greater or smaller input 
intensity.  So ownership can have a direct effect on productivity, say if foreign-owned 
establishments have access to superior technology, and an indirect effect, say if they 
are more capital intensive.  We therefore fit the following model:  
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This equation should not be interpreted as a structural relationship.  Rather its aim is 
descriptive: how much of the variance of productivity can the included variables 
explain?  The results of fitting this model for 1989 and 1993 appear in Table 5.  1993 
is used because it is the latest year available and the influence of the starting values 
for the capital stock estimates will be minimised.  On the other hand 1993 is a 
recession year while 1989 is a peak.  The results for the two years are in fact very 
similar though slightly stronger for 1989.   
 
We can explain about half the variance of labour productivity across establishments.  
Capital per worker is highly significant though the size of the coefficient is sensitive 
to the other variables included.  The variables measuring human capital per worker 
are also highly significant.  Including the wage variables adds considerably to the 
 
11  Results including employment size are in Oulton (1998b), Table 11.  The role of size is discussed 
further in section 5 below.   
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explanatory power.  But because the wage variables might be also picking up rent-
sharing or union power, results are shown as well with these variables excluded.   
 
The dummy for US ownership is significant but that for other foreign ownership is 
not.  In other words, non-US foreign ownership leads to higher physical and human 
capital, but no further effect on productivity.  But US-owned plants seem to have 
some additional advantage, over and above greater capital per worker of both types.  
This might be superior management, better process technology or better products (i.e. 
products able to command a higher price in the market).  Whatever the source, US 
ownership conferred an additional advantage of between 9 and 20% in 1993 (14–21% 
in 1989).12  However, since our analysis is confined to survivors we cannot allow for 
the impact of the more recent Japanese and Korean multinationals, who have made 
large, green field investments.  If these could be included, we might need to take a 
more favourable view of non-US foreign ownership.   
 
A possible way of minimising the effect of foreign ownership is to argue that foreign 
companies are just particularly good at picking winners.  According to this view, the 
foreign-owned establishments would have been successful anyway.  Perceiving the 
likelihood of success, foreign companies took them over.  The problem with this 
argument is that it requires remarkable prescience on the part of the foreign 
companies, since many of these establishments have been in foreign ownership for 
much of the period studied.  For example, 176 of the 1,752 survivors were in US 
ownership in 1993.  Of these, three quarters had been US-owned for 15 years or more 
and over half for 20 years or more.  (Other foreign ownership tends to be more recent.  
One half of the 235 establishments in this category in 1993 had been so for 6 years or 
less and less than a third for 15 or more.)  
 
As an alternative to a dummy variable for current ownership, we can also measure the 
impact of ownership by the number of years in US or other foreign ownership.  This is 
a rather different concept from current ownership status since some establishments 
 
12  If size (log employment) is included as an additional regressor in equation (2), its coefficient is 
significant and positive except in 1989 when wages are included. Its inclusion has little effect on the 
coefficient on capital intensity. The US ownership dummy remains significant, except in 1993 with 
wages included, but reduced in size. This suggests that part of the reason for US success may be that 
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may have been in US ownership for part of our period even though currently they are 
not.  In fact, 183 establishments ceased to be US-owned and 193 became US-owned 
at some point over 1973-93.  Altogether 305 establishments experienced some period 
of US ownership.  Changes in and out of other foreign ownership were of similar 
frequency: 156 establishments ceased to be in this category while 327 entered it. 
 
Instead of the ownership dummies, we can enter years under US ownership and years 
under other foreign ownership into the regression of equation (2).  The third and sixth 
columns of Table 5 show the results.  Years of US ownership are significant, while 
years of other foreign ownership are not.  Each year under US ownership raises labour 
productivity by between 0.5 and 0.8%.  The conclusion is that more than just picking 
winners is involved in the superior performance of US-owned firms.13  
 
We can now employ the estimates reported in Tables 4 and 5 to decompose the 
productivity gap between foreign and UK-owned establishments into an explained 
and an unexplained portion.  From Table 4, we see that, after controlling for industrial 
structure, US ownership confers an advantage in value added per worker of 
(exp[0.2756]-1 = ) 31.7%.  Other foreign ownership confers an advantage of 14.6%, 
again after controlling for industrial structure.  These figures should be compared with 
the unadjusted gaps of 55% and 25% respectively (Table 2).  The contribution of each 
measured input to the US advantage is calculated as its estimated coefficient in the 
regression for ln(V/L), from Table 5, multiplied by the estimated coefficient on the US 
ownership dummy in the regression with this input as the dependent variable (from 
Table 4).  For example, the contribution of capital to explaining the US advantage in 
1993, if the wage variables are excluded, is 0.2948 x 0.2643 = 0.0779 which 
expressed as a percentage is 8.1%.  The contribution of each input to the other foreign 
advantage is calculated analogously.   
 
The estimated contributions appear in Table 6.  If the wage variables are excluded, 
capital intensity explains 26% of the US advantage and 60% of the other foreign 
advantage.  With wages included, the contribution of capital is halved, to 12% and 
 
US owned establishments are larger (see Table 2).  But it could equally well be argued that high 
productivity companies are able to become larger than their less productive competitors.   
 15
29% respectively.  Interpreting the wage variables and the ATC proportion as 
measuring labour quality, between them they account for 49% of the US advantage 
and 68% of the other foreign advantage.  All told, the measured inputs, including 
labour quality, account for 61% of the US advantage and 97% of the other foreign 
one.   
 
 
4. The One Source database of company accounts 
 
We now turn to the results employing company data.  Our data are derived from the 
OneSource CD-ROM entitled “UK Companies, Volume 1” for December 1996.  This 
contains the accounts of some 110,000 larger UK companies.  The ultimate source is 
the accounts which companies are legally required to deposit at Companies House.  
The criteria for inclusion in “Volume 1” is stated by OneSource to be: “All public 
limited companies, all companies with employees greater than 50, and the top 
companies based on turnover, net worth, total assets, or shareholders funds 
(whichever is largest) up to a maximum of 110,000 companies”.  Only “live” 
companies are included.  Companies which are dormant, dissolved, in liquidation, or 
in the process of being wound up are excluded.   
 
The database contains the latest available accounts and related information for each 
included company, including the date of the end of the accounting period.  Though the 
CD-ROM which we used is dated December 1996, the data relate to a somewhat 
earlier period, which varies between companies according to the date of their 
accounts.  For the great majority of companies, this date falls within 1995 (the 
average is about two thirds of the way through 1995).  Hence for simplicity we refer 
to the year to which the data relate as 1995.14  Companies are classified under the 
1980 SIC.   
 
Output can be measured by either sales or value added (the latter defined as trading 
profit plus the wage bill).  Physical capital is measured by the book value of fixed 
 
13  These results are thus in line with a large literature stressing the productive effects of foreign 
investment (e.g. Dunning 1981; Barrell and Pain 1997).  
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assets.  Clearly, this is likely to be a very noisy measure of the true value, since it is in 
nominal terms and companies differ both in the time pattern of asset acquisition and 
in their depreciation practices.  Employment is a headcount.  There is no breakdown 
by type of labour or by skill but we can calculate the average wage which may serve 
as a proxy for the average level of human capital per worker.   
 
For each company, OneSource gives first, the country of the holding company which 
owns the company in question and second, the country of the ultimate holding 
company.  Either or both of these may of course be missing; “country” can include the 
UK.  Foreign-owned companies are broken down into two groups, (a) US-owned 
companies and (b) other foreign-owned companies.  A company is classified as US-
owned if either the country of the ultimate holding company is the US or, if this is 
missing, the country of the holding company is the US.  Other foreign ownership is 
determined analogously.   
 
Amongst UK-owned companies we distinguish between subsidiaries of UK-owned 
companies and independent UK companies which do not own any subsidiaries.  This 
is to avoid double-counting: if e.g. a UK-owned company owns five UK subsidiaries, 
we include the five subsidiaries but not the holding company.15  Avoidance of double 
counting leads to the elimination of 21,009 companies.  A company is classified as a 
UK-owned subsidiary if is not an ultimate holding company and either the country of 
its ultimate holding company is the UK or, if this is missing, the country of its holding 
company is the UK.  A company is classified as a UK-owned independent without 
subsidiaries if it is not an ultimate holding company and it is not a subsidiary.   
 
These four categories should be mutually exclusive but unfortunately this is not the 
case in practice.  There is an inconsistency in the OneSource database: some 
companies are classified as subsidiaries by one variable, the subsidiary indicator 
variable, but as independent by the type of ownership variable; the latter variable is 
the one used to exclude ultimate holding companies.  We cannot resolve this 
 
14  We excluded 1,104 companies whose accounts predated 1994.  A few other companies were also  
excluded since they claimed to have zero employees, even though supposedly actively trading.   
15  The accounts for a holding company would normally be consolidated, i.e. they would incorporate 
the results of its subsidiaries.  In some cases, the results of foreign subsidiaries may be included in the 
accounts of UK-based holding companies.  Our procedure ensures that such results are also excluded.   
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inconsistency so we simply drop the companies which fall into more than one 
category.  This leads to the elimination of 1,447 companies.   
 
A further 45,260 companies are lost due to missing or zero values. In summary, we 
start with 107,829 companies (after eliminating companies with out-of-date accounts), 
we eliminate a further 67,716 and the sample is then 40,113 companies which 
employed collectively 10.020 million people.  Value added is available for a smaller 
number: 36,226 companies employing 9.391 million.  We also exclude loss-making 
companies, and so we arrive eventually at 31,954 companies employing 8.639 million 
employees (see Appendix B, Table B2).16  The private sector, a wider category than 
the corporate sector, employed just over 17 million in mid-1995 when self-
employment is excluded (Economic Trends Annual Supplement 1997, Table 3.8), so 
over half of employment in the corporate sector is covered by our analysis.   
 
 
5.  Ownership and productivity: results for company data 
 
We start by considering some descriptive statistics (see Appendix B for the detail).  
Overall, UK subsidiaries account for 54.5% of employment, US-owned companies for 
13.0% and other foreign-owned companies for 22.1%.  The remainder, 10.5%, is in 
UK independents.  But this latter figure is an underestimate of the population 
proportion since our sample excludes many smaller companies.   
 
As a summary measure, we calculate the employment-weighted means of labour 
productivity (value added per employee, V/L) for each SIC80 Class and for the four 
types of ownership.  We also calculate the employment-weighted means of the 
determinants or correlates of productivity: physical capital intensity (K/L) and human 
capital intensity (w).  That is, each mean is an employment-weighted average over the 
companies within a particular Class.  This information is summarised in Table 7, 
which shows quartiles of the distribution across Classes of these employment-
weighted means.17  Here the means are expressed as index numbers with the value for 
 
16  The maximum sample for which employment is available is 49,009 companies.  These collectively 
employed 10.775 million: see Appendix B, Table B1 of Oulton (1998c).   
17  The detailed data are in Oulton (1998c), Appendix B, Table B2.   
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UK independents set equal to 100.  The rank order for all three measures is foreign-
owned first, UK subsidiaries second and last, UK independents.  Clearly the 
distributions for US- and other foreign-owned companies tend to lie above those for 
UK independents and subsidiaries.  Though the largest differences are between UK 
independents and the rest, the differences between UK subsidiaries and the foreign-
owned companies are also substantial.  Median productivity is 18% lower in UK 
subsidiaries than in US-owned companies, 10% lower than in other foreign 
companies.  Foreign-owned companies have much higher capital intensity.  Median 
capital per employee is 36% higher in US companies, 50% higher in other foreign 
companies.  Foreign companies also pay much higher wages, indicating a 
considerably more skilled labour force.  The median wage is 17% higher in US 
companies, 15% higher in other foreign ones.   
 
In order to see whether these impressions stand up to more rigorous analysis, we 
regress input intensity and other characteristics of companies on the ownership 
dummies and the controls, following equation (1).  We do these regressions separately 
for manufacturing (SIC80 Divisions 2-4) and non-manufacturing (Divisions 0,1, and 
6-9): see Table 8.18  Physical capital intensity is measured by the log of the capital-
labour ratio, while the log of the wage acts as a proxy for human capital per worker. 
Here, in addition to the dummy variables for the SIC80 Class to which each company 
is assigned, we employ a number of other control variables.  Since companies’ 
accounts do not all relate to exactly the same period, the date of each company’s 
financial year end is included.  We include too company age since new companies 
may have not yet reached their optimal scale.  The three ownership dummies are: US 
(=1 if US-owned), NON-US (=1 if foreign- but not US-owned), and UKSUB (=1 if 
owned by a UK company), with UK independents being the omitted category.19   
 
18  Table 8 excludes companies which had losses in 1995; that is, companies where the wage bill 
exceeded value added; there were 4,272 such companies.  For comparable results where such 
companies are included, see Tables 2 and 3 of Oulton (1998c).   
19  US companies are significantly larger in employment terms than all other types of company in 
both manufacturing and non-manufacturing (Appendix B, Table B2), and this remains true even after 
controlling for industrial composition.  Other foreign-owned companies are larger than UK 
independents and UK subsidiaries in manufacturing; in non-manufacturing, while being considerably 
larger than UK independents, they are a little smaller than UK subsidiaries.  Hence it could be argued 
that some of the advantages of foreign ownership which we find may really be advantages of size.  We 
therefore tried to test for the presence of economies of scale by including two measures of size, 
employment and value added, both in logs.  These two measures, while highly significant, have 
opposite signs: the coefficient on log employment is negative (except in the equation for K/L in 
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The foreign ownership dummies are highly significant in both manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing.  Table 9, which derives from Table 8, shows the percentage effect 
of type of ownership on the determinants of labour productivity, capital intensity and 
skill (proxied by wages), and their effect on labour productivity itself.  In general and 
relative to UK independents, foreign ownership, whether US or other, is associated 
with substantially higher capital intensity and higher skill (wages).  UK subsidiaries 
tend to have lower capital intensity than even UK independents but similar skill 
levels.  Foreign ownership has a much bigger effect on capital intensity in 
manufacturing than in non-manufacturing. But for skill the foreign ownership effect is 
much larger in non-manufacturing.  
 
Foreign ownership is therefore positively correlated with input intensity.  So we shall 
obtain a maximum estimate of the effect of foreign ownership by regressing 
productivity on ownership plus controls only (see the lower panel of Table 9). In 
manufacturing, relative to UK independents, US ownership raises labour productivity 
by 35%, while other foreign ownership raises it by 23%.  In non-manufacturing the 
US effect is even larger, 49%, while the other foreign effect is not much less, 46%.  
UK subsidiaries also have an advantage over UK independents, but it is much smaller, 
6% in manufacturing and 9% in non-manufacturing.  Hence UK subsidiaries have 
substantially lower productivity than foreign-owned ones.20   
 
The productivity gap in manufacturing using company data is remarkably similar to 
the gap estimated from the ARD sample: From the companies sample, US ownership 
raises labour productivity by 35% after controlling for industrial structure, other 
foreign ownership raises productivity by 23% (Table 9).  The corresponding figures 
from the ARD sample are 32% and 15% (Table 6).  Since the two samples are 
independent and employ different units (establishments versus companies), this adds 
 
manufacturing) while that on log value added is positive.  Since economies of scale cannot be both 
increasing and decreasing, these variables cannot be measuring economies of scale.  Employment is in 
the denominator of each of the dependent variables in Table 8, while value added is related to the 
numerator. So the effects captured by these variables are probably spurious (division bias).   
20  When companies making losses are included, the advantage of foreign ownership are reduced 
somewhat while still remaining very substantial, and the gap between UK subsidiaries and UK 
independents virtually disappears (see Tables 2 and 3 of Oulton (1998c)).   
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confidence to the conclusions.  It suggests that the use of survivors is not distorting 
the ARD-based results.   
 
Next in Table 10 we shows the results of running the regression of equation (2) on the 
companies sample.  It turns out that the regressions can explain some 67-71% of the 
variance of log productivity.  Despite the fact that both physical and human capital21 
are poorly measured in our data, each of these variables is highly significant.   
 
In both manufacturing and non-manufacturing, UK independents (the omitted 
category amongst the ownership dummies) are at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis 
both UK subsidiaries and foreign-owned companies.  Being a UK subsidiary seems to 
confer no disadvantage vis-à-vis non-US companies in manufacturing nor vis-à-vis 
US companies in non-manufacturing.  But US companies have a substantial 
productivity advantage over all other kinds of company in manufacturing, while other 
foreign-owned companies have a similar advantage in non-manufacturing.22   
 
In the regressions of Table 10, the ownership dummies measure the direct effects of 
ownership; the indirect effects via input intensity must also be taken into account.  We 
have already seen from Tables 8 and 9 that ownership has highly significant effects on 
input intensity.   
 
The productivity gaps associated with ownership which are revealed in tables 8 and 9 
— the 35% lead of US companies over UK independents in manufacturing or their 
49% lead in non-manufacturing — are much larger than the direct ownership effects 
of Table 10.  We therefore conclude that most of the effects of ownership on 
productivity are indirect, i.e. foreign ownership leads to higher human and physical 
 
21  As mentioned above, since human capital is proxied by the wage, there is the possibility of reverse 
causation here: high productivity may lead to high wages through rent-sharing or union bargaining 
power.   
22  Similar results were obtained with sales per employee as the dependent variable.  But the foreign 
ownership effects are larger.  This suggests that foreign ownership affects the extent to which 
companies use intermediate input.  In other words, foreign-owned companies tend to be more reliant on 
outsourcing.  We also tested for scale effects by including either the log of employment or the log of 
value added.  Once again, these variables had opposite signs, negative on employment and positive on 
value added.  Hence they cannot be interpreted as measuring economies of scale.  These results are in 
Oulton (2000), Table 5.   
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capital intensity and this accounts for the productivity gap.23  So in this respect too, 
the companies sample confirms conclusions derived from the ARD sample.   
 
 
6.  Interpreting the findings: two alternatives 
 
The substantial productivity lead of foreign-owned companies shown by our results is 
in line with a large literature stressing the productive effects of foreign investment 
(e.g. Dunning 1981; Barrell and Pain 1997).  But now the obvious question to ask is, 
if foreign-owned companies, located in Britain and employing British workers, use 
high human and physical capital intensity to achieve high productivity, why don’t 
British-owned companies do the same?  We explore two alternative, not mutually 
exclusive, hypotheses capable of explaining our findings: first, the cost of capital is 
lower for foreign-owned companies; and second, foreign-owned companies use 
superior technology.   
 
Do UK-owned companies face a higher cost of capital? 
The first explanation is that UK-owned companies face a higher cost of capital than 
foreign-owned ones, for a number of possible reasons.  Financial constraints are now 
widely believed to be an important influence on investment (Caballero 1997; Chirinko 
1993; Hubbard 1998).  Foreign companies are not presumably constrained to acquire 
funds for investment from the UK financial system, or at least not to the same extent 
as UK ones, so deficiencies in the UK system may be hindering investment by UK 
companies.  Foreign companies may also have a lower cost of internal funds (Miles 
1993).  An obvious objection to this is that large UK companies are themselves 
multinationals and face the same global capital market as foreign multinationals.  
However, the argument may have some force for smaller companies.  And it is still 
possible that when making investment decisions out of retained profits even large UK 
companies are constrained by the short-termist views of the UK stock exchange.24   
 
 
23  Oulton (2000) takes this argument a bit further by calculating TFP differences between companies.  
These differences are found to be only weakly correlated with ownership.   
24  I owe this point to Steve Bond.   
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A second reason why UK firms may have a higher cost of capital is that they face a 
less favourable risk-return trade-off than foreign ones; consequently they may prefer 
less capital-intensive technologies.  UK companies, even the large multinational ones, 
almost certainly make a higher proportion of their sales in the UK than do foreign 
companies.  They may be heavily influenced in their investment decisions by the 
memory of bad experiences in the three long recessions of the last 25 years (the 
working lifetime of the people now running UK companies).  If the UK is perceived 
as having greater macro instability than other countries, then even if UK firms are no 
more risk averse than foreign ones, they will perceive their overall risk level as 
higher.  By contrast, the large foreign multinationals which operate in UK 
manufacturing may be better able to balance the risk of poor outcomes in the UK 
against the chance of good ones elsewhere.  Consequently, their preferred capital-
labour ratio may be higher.  This argument assumes that capital intensive technologies 
are riskier.  This in turn may be justified if investment in physical capital is at least 
partially irreversible while labour and other inputs may be adjusted at relatively low 
cost.   
 
Empirically, the second reason would be hard to distinguish from the first.  In both 
cases, companies would act as if they faced a higher cost of capital, though the reason 
for the higher cost differs.   
 
Capital-skill complementarity and the cost of capital 
A lower cost of capital for foreign-owned firms in conjunction with capital-skill 
complementarity could account for our findings.  It has often been argued that capital 
and skilled labour are complements: see e.g. Griliches 1965; Fallon and Layard 1975; 
Berman et al. 1994; Goldin and Katz 1998.  Assume that competition prevails and 
that output (value added) is produced under constant returns to scale by means of 
three inputs: capital, skilled labour and unskilled labour.  Assume too that capital 
costs are lower for foreign-owned firms, while wages for given skills are the same.  If 
capital and skilled workers are complements, then foreign-owned firms will employ a 
higher ratio of skilled to unskilled workers.  This is consistent with what we observe 
in manufacturing using the ARD sample.  The capital-skill complementarity 
hypothesis implies too that the average wage in foreign-owned companies will be 
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higher than in domestically owned ones, consistent with what we observe in the 
companies sample.  
 
If capital and skilled workers are complements, then capital and unskilled labour must 
be substitutes. This leads to foreign-owned firms using a higher ratio of capital to 
unskilled workers.  But, even though firms with lower capital costs use more skilled 
workers, it can be shown that such firms will nonetheless have a higher ratio of capital 
to total labour (skilled plus unskilled).  This is also consistent with observation.   
 
These propositions are derived rigorously under the assumption of a translog cost 
function in Oulton (2000).  There it is also shown that the hypothesis implies that the 
share of capital costs in total costs will be higher for foreign-owned companies.  This 
proposition is tested using the companies sample and support is found for 
manufacturing, but not for non-manufacturing.  Therefore the ultimate reason why 
UK companies invest less than foreign-owned ones outside of manufacturing remains 
to be found.   
 
Foreign ownership and macroeconomic instability 
A lower cost of capital for foreign-owned firms has another implication.  UK-owned 
companies which are damaged by a recession may be unable to invest as much as 
comparable companies which have been less damaged.  A recession may drain a 
company’s financial resources and make it more dependent on an unsympathetic 
capital market.  But foreign-owned companies may be able to rely on the strength of 
their parent or on a supposedly more sympathetic foreign capital market.  We can test 
this hypothesis with the ARD sample.  The ARD does not contain any balance sheet 
variables which would enable us to measure a company’s financial health directly.  
But we can measure the size of the shock that an establishment suffers in a recession 
by, for example, the change in output.  This suggests testing the following equation:  
 
 itstiritits ControlsYLK ε++∆β+β=∆ −,10 ln)/ln(           (3) 
 
The dependent variable is the growth in capital intensity during the course of a boom 
taking place from time t-s to t.  The main explanatory variable is the growth of gross 
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output over the preceding recession from t-s-r to t-s.  The controls used are the SIC80 
Class dummies and a foreign ownership dummy (FOREIGN = 1 if foreign-owned).  
The growth of capital intensity is used in preference to the growth of capital since a 
fall in output may indicate not just bad luck but poor prospects for the company.  Such 
a company might rationally wish to invest less.  But there seems no reason, other than 
financial difficulties, why a company which survives should use a less capital 
intensive technique just because its future growth prospects are not so good as they 
may once have appeared.  Nevertheless, results are presented also for capital stock 
growth as the dependent variable.   
 
The hypothesis to be tested is β1 > 0: the greater the fall in output during a recession, 
the lower the rise in capital intensity in the subsequent boom.  But we also allow for 
the possibility that β1 differs between foreign and domestically-owned companies by 
interacting the output growth variable with the foreign ownership dummy: i.e., we 
assume β1 = β2 + β3·FOREIGN.  If foreign-owned companies are less affected by 
recessions, then the coefficient on this interaction variable will be negative.   
 
The results of estimating this equation over two boom-recession periods are in Table 
11. The first boom is 1975-79, following a recession from 1973-75.  The second is 
1981-89, following the 1979-81 recession.  It will be seen that β1 is significantly 
positive so macroeconomic instability does indeed appear to damage investment, 
whether capital intensity or capital growth is the dependent variable.  However, the 
interaction variable in Table 11 is never significant.  In other words, foreign-owned 
firms reduce their investment just as much as UK-owned ones as a result of bad 
experiences during a recession.  This is evidence against the view that the difference 
in capital intensity between foreign and UK-owned companies is due to the UK 
financial system.25   
 
Do foreign-owned companies employ superior technology? 
The second hypothesis to explain the findings is that foreign companies are using 
superior technology and business methods.  For this hypothesis to be a complete 
 
25  The conclusion is not altered if separate dummies are introduced for US and non-US ownership.  
Note that during the 1979-81 recession the mean fall in output was about the same for foreign as for 
UK establishments.   
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explanation, these superior technologies must be more intensive in both capital and 
skilled labour.  UK companies may just be slow to learn from and apply the best 
foreign practice, for several possible reasons.  First, the relevant knowledge may be 
commercially confidential or located in the heads of foreign managers.  Second, there 
may be work force resistance to change.  In the latter case, it might not pay for an 
established firm to adopt the superior technology because of the upfront cost of 
strikes, etc.  This will be all the more likely if the firm is a satisficer rather than a 
maximiser.26   
 
Objections can be raised against this second explanation too.  It would seem rather 
odd if superior technology is in general more intensive in both capital and skilled 
labour.  Some superior business methods, e.g. just in time, require less (inventory) 
capital not more.  Also, the larger UK companies at least must be well aware of their 
foreign rivals’ technology and could hire foreign managers if they so desired.  And 
how potent is work force resistance after the trade union reforms of the 1980s?  While 
there are few areas of manufacturing which are not exposed to foreign competition, 
the same is not true of services.  So the fact that the productivity gap seems to be 
about the same in manufacturing as in non-manufacturing argues against competition 
or the lack of it being the explanation.   
 
This explanation really boils down to the assertion that TFP levels differ between 
foreign-owned and UK firms.  But we have already seen that, after controlling for 
differences in input intensities, ownership alone cannot explain very much of the 
productivity gap (Tables 6 and 10).  So this hypothesis fails to convince.27   
 
Multinationals: a third hypothesis? 
Doms and Jensen (1998) in their study of US manufacturing were able to break down 
their domestically owned (i.e. US) firms into those which are multinationals and those 
 
26  Baily and Gersbach (1995) argue that the crucial factor in inducing firms to adopt best practice 
technology is exposure to global, not just local or regional, competition.  See also Nickell (1995, 
chapter 4) and (1996) on the beneficial effects of competition on productivity.   
27  Oulton (2000) presents estimates of TFP levels for the companies sample, using two alternative 
methods.  This study finds that TFP in UK subsidiaries is similar to that of all foreign-owned 
companies in non-manufacturing and to that of US companies in manufacturing; TFP is lower in UK 
independents.  Even for the latter group TFP differences account for less than a third of the labour 
productivity gap with US-owned companies.   
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which operate only in the home market.  They find that the real difference is between 
multinationals and non-multinationals, not foreign and domestically owned firms.  
This suggests a third explanation based on the theory of foreign investment.  At any 
moment there is a range of capabilities amongst a country’s firms.  The better 
companies develop specific advantages.  These allow them to compete successfully in 
foreign markets and consequently to go multinational (Dunning 1981).  The foreign-
domestic productivity gap which we observe simply reflects this process.  Indeed, the 
observed gap is on this view rather misleading since the performance of the more 
successful, domestically owned multinationals is being obscured by their less 
successful colleagues who operate only in the home market.   
 
Whether this explanation works for the UK as well as for the US is unclear.  It would 
require much more work beyond the scope of this chapter to identify the UK 
multinationals in the OneSource or ARD databases.  But even if some British 
multinationals have high productivity, they must still represent a comparatively small 
proportion of UK employment, otherwise we would not find that the employment-
weighted mean of productivity is generally lower in UK subsidiaries (Table 7).  In any 
case, it is not clear that this third explanation is different from the other two since the 
specific advantages of multinationals have to show up in some measurable way (e.g. 
in technology or in the cost of capital).   
 
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
Results for manufacturing based on the ARD 
We have developed a dataset of 1,752 establishments which appear continuously in 
the ARD from 1973 to 1993 inclusive. For each of these survivors, we have been able 
to estimate the capital stock. Of course these survivors are atypical by virtue of the 
fact simply that they have survived. Nevertheless, they make up about a third of the 
employment recorded in the ARD, they contain a wide range of sizes (the average is 
590 employees), and have a foreign-owned proportion which is similar to the overall 
figure. Based on this dataset, our main results are as follows:  
1. There are large differences in capital intensity (the capital-labour ratio), between 
establishments located in the same 2-digit Class (of which there are 22 in 
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manufacturing). These current differences in capital intensity arise solely from 
differences in cumulated investment over the period 1973-93, since the capital 
intensity of all establishments in a given Class was of necessity assumed to be 
identical in 1973.  
2. The differences between establishments in productivity and capital intensity are 
not just random. There are systematic factors at work as well. Foreign-owned 
establishments, and in particular US-owned ones, substantially outperform UK-
owned ones. On average foreign-owned establishments operate with 50% more 
capital per worker and achieve 38% higher value added per worker. Their labour 
forces are more white collar and considerably better paid. These disparities in 
performance cannot be dismissed as due simply to the concentration of foreign 
ownership in high productivity or high capital intensity sectors.  
3. We found that physical and human capital intensity are significant determinants of 
productivity at a point in time. Our cross section regressions, which control for 
industrial structure as well, can account for about a half of the variation across 
establishments in value added per worker. In addition, US-ownership is found to 
confer a productivity advantage of between 9 and 20%, over and above the 
advantage conferred by higher capital intensity in US-owned establishments.  
4. The total US advantage in value added per worker is 31.7%, after controlling for 
industrial structure. The measured inputs, capital intensity and labour quality, can 
explain 61% of this gap. In the case of other foreign owned establishments, the 
labour productivity advantage is lower, 14.6% after controlling for industrial 
structure, and the measured inputs account for 97% of this gap.   
 
Results based on the companies sample 
The Introduction asked, do foreign-owned companies have as big a lead in labour 
productivity in the rest of the economy as they do in manufacturing? The answer is 
yes.  In fact the lead is larger.  After controlling for industrial composition and other 
factors, US ownership was found to raise productivity by 35% in manufacturing, 
relative to UK independents; other foreign ownership raises it 23%.  In the rest of the 
economy, US and other foreign ownership raise productivity by even more, 49% and 
46% respectively.  In manufacturing, the companies sample and the ARD sample tell 
much the same story.  For both manufacturing and non-manufacturing, the foreign 
lead over UK subsidiaries is not much lower than the lead over UK independents.  
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The foreign productivity lead can very largely be explained, or at least accounted for, 
by higher capital per employee and a more skilled labour force.   
 
We have suggested that these findings are broadly consistent with the hypothesis that 
the cost of capital is lower for foreign-owned companies.  If in addition capital and 
skilled labour are complements, foreign-owned companies would employ more 
physical capital and a higher proportion of skilled workers and thus enjoy higher 
labour productivity on both counts.  Oulton (2000), using a cost function approach, 
finds empirical support for this proposition in manufacturing using the companies 
sample, but not in non-manufacturing.   
 
A further bit of evidence which tends against the cost of capital hypothesis is the 
investment behaviour of establishments in booms and recessions.  Establishments 
which suffered more severely in the two recessions of 1973-75 and 1979-81 increased 
their capital intensity less in the subsequent booms than did more fortunate 
establishments.  However, there was no difference in this respect between foreign and 
UK-owned establishments.  In other words, macroeconomic instability seems to have 
had some adverse effects on investment, but no more so for domestic than for foreign 
companies.  This is some evidence against the view that the shortfall in investment by 
UK-owned companies is due to the UK financial system.   
 
If we ask the question — why is labour productivity so much lower in UK 
subsidiaries and independents in non-manufacturing? — the proximate answer is 
clear.  These companies use substantially lower capital and skill inputs (Table 9).  It is 
not surprising therefore that their labour productivity level is much lower.  But we 
have not found an explanation as to why, faced apparently with the same input prices, 
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Divisions and Classes of SIC80 
 
Division 0  Agriculture, forestry and fishing 




Division 1  Energy and water 
11 Coal extraction and manufacture of solid fuel 
12 Coke ovens 
13 Extraction of mineral oil and natural gas 
14 Mineral oil processing 
15 Nuclear fuel production 
16 Production and distribution of electricity, gas and other forms of energy 
17 Water supply industry 
  
Division 2  Metals, mineral products and chemicals 
21 Extraction and preparation of metalliferous ores 
22 Metal manufacturing 
23 Extraction of minerals not elsewhere specified 
24 Manufacturing of non-metallic mineral products 
25 Chemical industry 
26 Production of manufacturing-made fibres 
  
Division 3  Metal goods, engineering and chemicals 
31 Manufacture of metal goods not elsewhere specified 
32 Mechanical engineering 
33 Manufacturing of office machinery and data processing equipment 
34 Electrical and electronic engineering 
35 Manufacture of motor vehicles and parts 
36 Manufacture of other transport equipment 
37 Instrument engineering 
  
Division 4  Other manufacturing industries 
41/42 Food, drink and tobacco manufacturing industries 
43 Textile industry 
44 Manufacturing of leather and leather goods 
45 Footwear and clothing industries 
46 Timber and wooden furniture industries 
47 Manufacturing of paper and paper products; printing and publishing 
48 Processing of rubber and plastics 
49 Other manufacturing industries 
  
Division 5   Construction 
50 Construction 
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Divisions and Classes of SIC80 (continued) 
 
Division 6  Distribution, hotels and catering, and repair 
61 Wholesale distribution (except dealing in scrap and waste materials) 
62 Dealing in scrap and waste materials 
63 Commission agents 
64/65 Retail distribution 
66 Hotels and catering 
67 Repair of consumer goods and vehicles 
  
Division 7  Transport and communications  
71 Railways 
72 Other inland transport 
74 Sea transport 
75 Air transport 
76 Supporting services to transport 
77 Miscellaneous transport services and storage not elsewhere specified 
79 Postal services and telecommunications 
  
Division 8   Banking, insurance and real estate 
81 Banking and finance 
82 Insurance, except for compulsory social security 
83 Business services 
84 Renting of movables 
85 Owning and dealing in real estate 
  
Division 9   Social and personal services 
91 Public administration, national defence and compulsory social security 
92 Sanitary services 
93 Education 
94 Research and development 
95 Medical and other health services: veterinary services 
96 Other services provided to the general public 
97 Recreational services and other cultural services 
98 Personal services 





The companies sample 
 
Table B1 






Variable Ownership N Mean s.d.  N Mean s.d. 
ln(K/L) US  954 2.725 1.008  1,265 2.302 1.473 
 Other foreign  1,720 2.812 1.078  3,448 2.396 1.609 
 UK subsidiary 4,181 2.289 1.101  7,687 2.157 1.600 
 UK independent 3,206 2.346 0.983  9,493 2.303 1.365 
         
ln(w) US  954 2.860 0.337  1,265 3.158 0.533 
 Other foreign  1,720 2.813 0.341  3,448 3.008 0.630 
 UK subsidiary 4,181 2.686 0.359  7,687 2.716 0.569 
 UK independent 3,206 2.666 0.417  9,493 2.632 0.602 
         
ln(V/L) US  954 3.384 0.502  1,265 3.742 0.790 
 Other foreign  1,720 3.290 0.494  3,448 3.685 0.976 
 UK subsidiary 4,181 3.094 0.482  7,687 3.301 0.851 
 UK independent 3,206 3.020 0.480  9,493 3.111 0.729 
         
ln(L) US  954 5.290 1.464  1,265 4.236 1.643 
 Other foreign  1,720 4.967 1.397  3,448 3.789 1.655 
 UK subsidiary 4,181 4.725 1.283  7,687 4.073 1.555 
 UK independent 3,206 3.977 0.915  9,493 3.345 1.192 
         
ln(V) US  954 8.673 1.514  1,265 7.978 1.627 
 Other foreign  1,720 8.257 1.430  3,448 7.473 1.590 
 UK subsidiary 4,181 7.819 1.316  7,687 7.374 1.489 
 UK independent 3,206 6.997 0.863  9,493 6.456 1.041 
 
Source  OneSource.   
 
Note  Value added (V), capital (K) and the wage (w) are in units of thousands of 
pounds; labour (L) is number of employees.  The wage is calculated as the wage bill 











Companies Employment  Companies Employment 
 number number %  number number % 
US  954 596,559 17.5  1,265 522,501 10.0 
Other foreign  1,720 846,286 24.9  3,448 1,058,736 20.2 
UK subsidiary 4,181 1,690,324 49.7  7,687 3,014,726 57.6 
UK independent 3,206 269,871 7.9  9,493 639,990 12.2 
Total 10,061 3,403,043 100.0  21,893 5,235,952 100.0 
 
Source  OneSource.   
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Table 1 
Capital intensity (K/L) amongst 1973-93 survivors: 
manufacturing, by SIC80 Class, 1993 
 
Class N Mean Median s.d. of 
ln(K/L) 
22 73 58,990 48,805 0.698 
24 98 45,633 34,182 0.741 
25 164 83,732 59,240 0.686 
31 130 28,058 24,429 0.544 
32 214 28,413 22,704 0.611 
34 122 28,414 21,573 0.621 
35 47 48,983 37,800 0.885 
36 41 31,029 26,361 0.608 
37 32 22,125 19,184 0.563 
41 86 47,103 24,748 0.871 
42 84 63,993 49,736 0.613 
43 143 24,180 21,054 0.589 
45 96 6,732 5,960 0.554 
46 51 15,809 12,056 0.497 
47 245 37,996 29,792 0.599 
48 75 39,179 32,013 0.536 
49 23 26,144 24,674 0.547 
All 
classesa 
1,747 39,140 27,276 0.827 
 
Source  ARD.  
 
a. Including omitted Classes (23, 26, 33 and 44).  
 
Note Capital intensity is K/L where K is the capital stock in 1990 £ and L is total 
employment. 5 Classes omitted due to zero or small numbers. See the Appendix for 
the names of the Classes.  
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics in 1993 for 1973-93 survivors in manufacturing,  
by ownership 
 
Variable Ownership N Mean Ratio to UK-
owned mean 
S.D. Median 
Y/L Foreign, non-US 235 95,542 1.52 84,985 75,824 
 US-owned 176 105,185 1.68 77,606 81,059 
 UK-owned 1336 62,781 1.00 67,898 47,006 
       
V/L Foreign, non-US 235 28,316 1.25 18,839 24,434 
 US-owned 176 35,008 1.55 22,924 29,191 
 UK-owned 1336 22,615 1.00 16,929 19,306 
       
K/L Foreign, non-US 235 51,358 1.47 47,154 39,264 
 US-owned 176 54,073 1.54 45,695 36,911 
 UK-owned 1336 35,024 1.00 47,906 24,538 
       
L Foreign, non-US 235 619 1.16 1,037 351 
 US-owned 176 975 1.82 2,375 485 
 UK-owned 1336 535 1.00 1,290 270 
       
wOP Foreign, non-US 233 14,935 1.17 3,936 14,595 
 US-owned 176 16,078 1.26 5,149 15,627 
 UK-owned 1324 12,736 1.00 4,074 12,627 
       
wATC Foreign, non-US 235 19,876 1.12 4,628 19,090 
 US-owned 176 21,858 1.24 6,863 20,475 
 UK-owned 1336 17,668 1.00 5,157 17,127 
       
ATC/L Foreign, non-US 235 0.389 1.20 0.188 0.338 
 US-owned 176 0.407 1.26 0.182 0.370 
 UK-owned 1336 0.323 1.00 0.189 0.281 
       
M/L Foreign, non-US 232 72,395 1.70 79,215 54,398 
 US-owned 174 74,851 1.75 68,785 56,058 
 UK-owned 1325 42,671 1.00 59,314 28,742 
 
Source  ARD.  
 
Note Y: Gross output (1990 £k); V: gross value added (1990 £k); L: total 
employment (number); ATC: Administrative, technical and clerical employees 
(number); K: Capital stock (1990 £k); wOP: operative wage (£, current prices); wATC: 
ATC wage (£, current prices);  M: intermediate input (1990 £k).  
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Table 3 
Growth rates of output, employment and capital, 1973-93:  
1973-93 survivors in manufacturing, by ownership in 1993 (% p.a.) 
 
Variable Ownership N Mean S.D. Median 
V/L NON-US   232 2.19 3.09 2.15 
 US 173 2.23 3.30 1.93 
 UK 1326 1.76 2.92 1.82 
      
K/L NON-US   235 4.60 3.17 4.56 
 US 176 4.27 3.41 4.38 
 UK 1336 2.85 3.36 2.84 
      
K NON-US   235 2.23 3.90 2.20 
 US 176 2.86 4.06 2.40 
 UK 1336 1.04 3.89 0.63 
      
L NON-US   235 -2.38 3.79 -2.52 
 US 176 -1.41 3.56 -1.33 
 UK 1341 -1.82 3.95 -1.66 
      
V NON-US   232 -0.16 4.46 -0.07 
 US 173 0.89 4.64 0.65 
 UK 1326 -0.06 4.78 0.08 
 
Source  ARD.  
 
Note L: total employment; V: gross value added (1990 prices); K: Capital stock 
(1990 prices).  
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Table 4 
Comparison of foreign and UK-owned establishments in manufacturing:  
cross section regressions, 1973-93 survivors in 1993 
 
 Dependent variable 
 ln(K/L) ln(ATC/L) ln(wOP) ln(wATC) ln(M/L) ln(V/L) 
US 0.2643** 0.1149** 0.1499** 0.1431** 0.4356** 0.2756** 
 (0.0526) (0.0384) (0.0241) (0.0211) (0.0552) (0.0443) 
NON-US   0.2832** 0.0768* 0.1050** 0.0796** 0.4297** 0.1362** 
 (0.0450) (0.0341) (0.0195) (0.0170) (0.0448) (0.0379) 
       
N 1747 1752 1733 1747 1752 1736 
R2 0.427 0.283 0.330 0.170 0.324 0.269 
 
Source  ARD.  
 
Note Model fitted by OLS is equation (1). Constant and dummies for 20 out of 21 
SIC80 Classes included but not reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Maximum possible number of observations is 1,752 but a few observations are lost 
for some dependent variables due to missing values. US=1 if US-owned; NON-US  =1 
if foreign-owned but not US-owned.  
 
*  Significant at the 5% level 
**  Significant at the 1% level  
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Table 5 
Regressions explaining productivity differences amongst survivors in 
manufacturing: dependent variable is log of value added per employee, 1989 and 
1993 
 
 1993 1993 1993 1989 1989 1989 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln(K/L) 0.1448* 0.2948* 0.1441** 0.1582** 0.2937** 0.1569** 
 (0.0244) (0.0221) (0.0242) (0.0199) (0.0251) (0.0199) 
ln(ATC/L) 0.0830** 0.1150** 0.0795** 0.1105** 0.1764** 0.1094** 
 (0.0235) (0.0242) (0.0235) (0.0213) (0.0218) (0.0214) 
ln(wOP) 0.6342** — 0.6315** 0.6380** — 0.6357** 
 (0.0597)  (0.0598) (0.0427)  (0.0427) 
ln(wATC) 0.3053** — 0.2987** 0.2620** — 0.2601** 
 (0.0454)  (0.0451) (0.0455)  (0.0456) 
US 0.0895* 0.1834** — 0.1337** 0.1889** — 
 (0.0399) (0.0418)  (0.0332) (0.0354)  
NON-US   -0.0012 0.0432 — -0.0243 0.0074 — 
 (0.0325) (0.0355)  (0.0368) (0.0399)  
US years — — 0.0054* — — 0.0081** 
   (0.0023)   (0.0022) 














   (0.0024)   (0.0029) 
N 1717 1731 1717 1739 1744 1739 
R2 0.475 0.379 0.476 0.512 0.415 0.511 
 
Source  ARD.   
 
Note Model fitted by OLS is equation (2).  Constant and dummies for 20 out of 21 
SIC80 Classes included but not reported.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
Maximum possible number of observations is 1,752 but a few observations are lost 
due to missing values. US=1 if US-owned; NON-US  =1 if foreign-owned but not US-
owned.  US years: number of years in US ownership.  NON-US years: number of 
years in other foreign ownership.   
 
*  Significant at the 5% level 
**  Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 6 
Contribution of measured inputs to explanation of productivity gap between 
foreign and UK-owned establishments:  
manufacturing in 1993 (1973-93 survivors) 
 
 US NON-US  










% of total Contrib-
ution 
% of total Contrib-
ution 
% of total Contrib-
ution 
% of total 
K/L 3.90 12.29 8.10 25.54 4.19 28.69 8.71 59.67 
ATC/L 0.96 3.02 1.33 4.19 0.64 4.38 0.89 6.08 
wOP 9.97 31.43 — — 6.89 47.19 — — 
wATC 4.47 14.07 — — 2.46 16.86 — — 
Total measured 19.30 60.82 9.43 29.73 14.17 97.12 9.59 65.75 
         
Non-specifica 9.36 29.51 20.13 63.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Total explained 28.66 90.32 29.56 93.16 14.17 97.12 9.59 65.75 
Unexplained 3.07 9.68 2.17 6.84 0.42 2.88 5.00 34.25 
TOTAL 31.73 100.00 31.73 100.00 14.59 100.00 14.59 100.00 
 
a.  The non-specific advantage is the estimated coefficient on the US or non-US 
ownership dummy in equation (2).   
 
Source  Coefficient estimates in Tables 4 and 5.  See text for explanation.   
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Table 7 
Labour productivity and its determinants by ownership type, 1995: 
distribution of within Class means across SIC80 Classes 
(UK independents=100) 
 
Variable Ownership Quartiles 
  25th 50th 75th 
V/L US 113.0 139.0 170.9 
 Other foreign 113.1 126.8 150.0 
 UK-owned 99.6 113.8 126.0 
K/L US 124.2 149.9 217.9 
 Other foreign 135.6 165.4 226.1 
 UK-owned 91.8 110.1 139.6 
w US 103.9 119.5 145.8 
 Other foreign 104.4 117.5 128.2 
 UK-owned 92.1 101.9 113.8 
 
Source Oulton (1998c), Appendix B, Table B2.   
 
Note 36 SIC80 Classes (35 for US-owned).  Within-Class means are 
 employment-weighted.   
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Table 8 
Ownership and the determinants of labour productivity in 1995 
 
 Manufacturing  Non-manufacturing 
 Dependent variable  Dependent variable 
 ln(K/L) lnw ln(V/L)  ln(K/L) lnw ln(V/L) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
ln(age) 0.0601** 0.0119** -0.0151**  0.1451** -0.0035 -0.0464** 
 (0.0104) (0.0042) (0.0051)  (0.0106) (0.0042) (0.0055) 
        
US 0.3544** 0.1452** 0.3038**  0.1215** 0.3429** 0.4004** 
 (0.0342) (0.0127) (0.0177)  (0.0415) (0.0149) (0.0216) 
        
NON-US 0.3906** 0.1039** 0.2091**  0.1226** 0.2629** 0.3797** 
 (0.0301) (0.0107) (0.0142)  (0.0291) (0.0118) (0.0160) 
        
UKSUB -0.1050** 0.0007 0.0553**  -0.2199** 0.0320** 0.0839** 
 (0.0227) (0.0086) (0.0107)  (0.0210) (0.0082) (0.0106) 
        
        
N 10,061 10,061 10,061  21,893 21,893 21,893 
R2 0.183 0.151 0.158  0.177 0.273 0.329 
 
Source  OneSource.  
 
Note  Companies included are either subsidiaries or independents which do not own any 
subsidiaries.  US=1 if US-owned; NON-US=1 if foreign but not US-owned; UKSUB=1 if company is a 
subsidiary of a UK company.  Omitted category is UK independent companies which do not own any 
subsidiaries.  Companies with negative profits excluded.  Constant and dummies for the 60 SIC80 Classes 
included but not reported.  Estimated by OLS.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses.   
 
*  Significant at the 5% level 




Effect of ownership on labour productivity and its determinants (per cent) 
           







K/L US +43 +13 
 NON-US +48 +13 
 UKSUB -10 -20 
    
w US +16 +41 
 NON-US +11 +30 
 UKSUB 0 +3 
    
V/L US +35 +49 
 NON-US +23 +46 
 UKSUB +6 +9 
 
Source  Table 8.   
 
Note  Each entry shows the percentage effect of a particular type of ownership 
on the dependent variable, relative to the omitted type of ownership, UK 
independents.  Each entry is calculated as 100*[exp( β̂ )-1] where β̂  is the estimated 
regression coefficient on the ownership dummy.   
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Table 10 
Effect of ownership on labour productivity (value added per employee):  
manufacturing versus non-manufacturing companies in 1995  
(dependent variable is ln(V/L)) 
 
 Manufacturing Non-manufacturing 
 (1) (2) 
ln(K/L) 0.1067** 0.1234** 
 (0.0054) (0.0040) 
   
ln(w) 0.9063** 0.8530** 
 (0.0190) (0.0116) 
   
ln(age) -0.0323** -0.0612** 
 (0.0033) (0.0039) 
   
US 0.1345** 0.0928** 
 (0.0120) (0.0154) 
   
NON-US 0.0732** 0.1403** 
 (0.0090) (0.0113) 
   
UKSUB 0.0658** 0.0838** 
 (0.0063) (0.0072) 
   
   
N 10,061 21,893 
R2 0.672 0.682 
 
Source  OneSource.   
 
Note  Companies included are either subsidiaries or independents which do not 
own any subsidiaries.  US=1 if US-owned; NON-US=1 if foreign but not US-owned; 
UKSUB=1 if company is a subsidiary of a UK company.  Omitted category is UK 
independent companies which do not own any subsidiaries.  Constant and dummies 
for the 60 SIC80 Classes included but not reported.  Estimated by OLS.  Robust 
standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
*  Significant at the 5% level 
**  Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 11 
Effect of recessions on capital stock growth in subsequent booms: 
manufacturing, 1973-93 survivors 
 
 Dependent variable 
 1981-89 1975-79 










     
FOREIGN 0.072* 0.149** 0.045* 0.030 
 (0.029) (0.031) (0.018) (0.018) 
     
∆rlnYt-s 0.297** 0.110* 0.220** 0.179** 
 (0.045) (0.048) (0.026) (0.027) 
     
FOREIGN*∆rlnYt-s -0.047 -0.010 -0.014 -0.100 
 (0.095) (0.101) (0.058) (0.060) 
     
N 1700 1700 1752 1752 
R2 0.110 0.080 0.101 0.077 
 
Source  ARD.  
 
Note OLS estimates of equation (3). Constant and dummies for SIC80 Class 
included but not reported.  The output growth variable (∆rlnYt-s) is the growth in 
output during the preceding recession, 1979-81 in the case of the 1981-89 boom and 
1973-75 in the case of the 1975-79 boom.  FOREIGN = 1 if foreign-owned. For 
1981-89, 52 establishments which switched their SIC80 Class over this period were 
excluded.   
 
*  Significant at the 5% level 
**  Significant at the 1% level 
 
